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4,

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section
78-2-2(j), Utah Code 1987-1988.
5.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

The appeal was brought by the petitioners pursuant to
the Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 3(a). The appellants
petitioned the lower court for release of one 1987 Dodge van,
Utah license 720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096, which was seized
pursuant to Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) by the Metro
Narcotics Strike Force.

A trial was held before the Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on the 8th day of April, 1988.

On the 14th

day of June, 1988, an order was entered granting the state
forfeiture of the vehicle.
6.
1.

THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Is there a security interest in the van that

prohibits forfeiture in this case?
2.

Do the facts support a forfeiture of the van?
7.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

The interpretation of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13,
(1988) is determinative and is set forth as an addendum to this
brief.
8.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A petition for the release of the Dodge van was filed
in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah.
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A trial was held

on April 8, 1988 to determine whether the State of Utah had the
right to forfeit the vehicle for violation of Utah Code,
Section 58-37-13, or the petitioners had the right to the
release of the vehicle.

On June 14, 1988, the Honorable J.

Dennis Frederick ordered the vehicle forfeited in its entirety
to the State of Utah.
On August 4, 1987, Officer Steven Olson of the Metro
Narcotics Strike Force traveled in a 1987 Dodge van, Utah
license number 720BHT, to purchase marijuana.
5).

(R.37 P.3, 4,

Joan Davis drove the van, Mike Davis and Walt were also in

the van.

(R.37 P.6-7).

Joan Davis was involved in

conversations regarding the purpose of the parties traveling in
the van, which was to buy marijuana from another source.
P.8).

(R.37

After Mike Davis purchased the marijuana from a person

located inside an apartment complex, Joan Davis drove the van
to 215 East 2850 South where she actively participated in
dividing the marijuana between the parties.

(R.37 P.9-10).

Joan Davis is the registered owner of the van and hers
is the only name which appears of record.

(R.39 P.18).

Joan

Davis told Officer Bill McCarthy that she owned the van and it
was paid for.

(R.37 P.50-51).

Gerald Davis indicated to Lt.

Marty Vuyk of the Metro Narcotics Strike Force that there was
no written agreement indicating a security interest existed on
the van.

(R.37 P.58).

Rosalee Hansen and Gerald Davis claim
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an interest in the van.
9.

(R.P.2).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Several of the issues raised by the petitioners1 brief
are improper.

The issues were never raised by the pleadings or

to the trial court.

Raising them on appeal for the first time

is improper.
One 1987 Dodge van, Utah license 720BHT, was used by
the registered owner to facilitate the sale and/or
transportation of a controlled substance.

This is a violation

of Utah Code, Section 58-37-13, the result of which is a
forfeiture of the vehicle to the State of Utah.
intent and meaning are clear.

The statute's

None of the exceptions apply and

therefore, the property is forfeitable.
Certificate of title is absolute evidence of
ownership.

The Motor Vehicle Act of the Utah Code sets forth

very specific actions that must take place at the time a
vehicle is registered.

A certificate of title puts creditors

and encumbrancers on notice as to who the owner is and these
persons have a right to be able to rely upon the certificate of
title.
In order for a security interest to be effective, it
must also appear of record.

The Motor Vehicle Act sets forth

specific actions which must take place to create a security
interest.

None of the provisions were complied with, making

-3-

any alleged interest in the van null and void.
The petitioners1 testimonies at trial were not
credible.

The stories they told were filled with discrepancies.

Each of their testimonies was conflicting as to themselves and
as to the other petitioners.

The trial court found there to be

loose ends and unexplained circumstances in the stories
presented to the court.
10.
I.

DETAIL OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFF ARE IMPROPER

It is well established that issues not raised by the
pleadings or addressed by the trial court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal.
(Utah 1986) .
the van.

Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 448, 491

The only issue raised at trial was ownership of

Therefore, the following issues raised by the brief

submitted by Joan E. Davis, et al., are improper:
1.

Is the statute on takings, Utah Code Annotated

Section 58-37-13 (1953 as amended), as applied to this case
unconstitutional under both the State and Federal Constitutions
because the results are grossly disproportionate to the crime?
2.

Is the taking and subsequent sale of the 1987

Dodge Caravan supported by the plain intent of Utah Code Ann,
58-37-13?
4.

May Officer William McCarthy's testimony be given

in civil proceedings if the State relies on statements made
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during criminal custody but before a Miranda warning was issued?
5.

Does the warrantless seizure of the 1987 Dodge

Caravan invalidate the proceedings below?

(Brief of the

appellant at page vii).
Judge Frederick clearly stated the issue as "whether
claimants Gerald Davis or his wife Joan Davis was the owner of
the vehicle in question and whether or not the claimant Rosalee
Hanson possessed a bona fide security interest precluding
forfeiture at least to the extent of hers, Rosalee Hansen's,
claimed interests."

(R.38 P.4). Therefore, the only proper

issues presented to this court is whether there was a
protectable security interest in the van and whether the facts
support the forfeiture.
II.

FORFEITURE WAS APPROPRIATE UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED
Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 provides for the

forfeiture of a vehicle used, or intended for use, to
transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of a
controlled substance.

The van was used to transport the

parties to an apartment complex where marijuana was purchased
and then the van returned the parties to a location where they
exited the van after the marijuana was divided inside the van.
(R.37 P.8, 9, 10). The statute is clear in its meaning and was
amended in 1987 to include simple possession.

In addition, the

van was used to facilitate a transportation and sale of
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marijuana.

One Blue 1977 AMC Jeep CJ-5 v. U.S., 783 P.2d 759

(8th Cir. 1986).
In State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338, 1340
(Utah 1986), the court aligns itself with the substantial
amount of authority that hold a vehicle is subject to
forfeiture no matter how small the quantity of contraband.

The

legislature, a year after this decision, brought the statute up
to date by replacing possession with simple possession.
Code, Section 58-37-13 (1987 and 1986).

Utah

The Pontiac case

further points out that the value of the vehicle in proportion
to the amount of drugs is immaterial.

Pontiac at 1341.

Additionally, Judge Frederick found that the van was knowingly
used to facilitate a sale of a controlled substance.
P.3).

(R.38

This court must review the evidence and all inferences

which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the finder of fact.
342, 345 (Utah 1985).

State v. Booker, 709 P.2d

Judge Frederick found Joan Davis's

testimony not credible and that she used the van for the
transportation and/or facilitation of the sale of marijuana.
(R.38 P.3). Therefore, the van is subject to forfeiture.
III.

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS ABSOLUTE
EVIDENCE OF OWNERSHIP

When applying for a certificate of title, the
application must contain "[a] statement of the applicant's
title and of all liens or encumbrances upon said vehicle and
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the names and addresses of all persons having any interest
therein and the nature of every such interest."

Utah Code,

Section 41-1-20 (d) (1987-1988) (effective through December 31,
1987) .
The actual certificate of title must contain "a statement of the owner's title and of all liens and encumbrances
upon the vehicle therein described . . . "
41-1-37 (1988).

Utah Code, Section

In the event no lien or encumbrance appears on

the certificate of title, it shall be delivered to the owner.

Utah Code, Section

41-1-39

(1988)

(Emphasis

added).

In determining who owns a vehicle in applying the
Family Purposes doctrine, the certificate of title constitutes
prima facie evidence of ownership.
89 (1987) .

French v. Barrett, 733 P.2d

Additionally, the Supreme Court of Montana has held

that the owner of a motor vehicle is that person whose name
appears on the certificate of title.
P.2d 633, 634 (Mont. 1986).

Kovacich v. Norgaard, 716

A certificate of title provides

notice who the actual owner is to all of third persons.

See Id.

In this case, Joan E. Davis's name is the only one
wftich appears on the

certificate of title.

Davis is the owner of the seized vehicle.
IV.

Therefore, Joan E.
(R.P.43).

TRANSFER OF TITLE MAY ONLY BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH
COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Transfer of title or interest in a vehicle may only be

accomplished by compliance with the Motor Vehicle Act.
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In

order for an owner of a car to transfer title, he must remove
the plates, send them to the Division of iMotor Vehicles and pay
a transfer fee.

Utah Code, Section 41-1-62 (1988) .

Further,

"[t]he owner shall endorse an assignment and warranty of title
upon the valid certificate of title issued for such vehicle by
the State of Utah or other state or country.

Said endorsement

and assignment shall include a statement of all liens or
encumbrances thereto, and shall be verified under oath by the
owner before a notary public or other person authorized by law
to administer oaths, and he shall deliver the valid certificate
of title and certificate of registration to the purchaser or
transferee at the time of delivering the vehicle, or within 48
hours thereof . . . "

Utah Code, Section 41-1-63 (1988) .

In order for a new owner to secure ownership in a
vehicle, "[t]he transferee . . . shall present to the
department the certificate of registration and the certificate
of title, properly endorsed, and shall apply for and obtain a
new certificate of title for said vehicle . . ."
Section 41-1-64 (1988).

Utah Code,

"The department upon receipt of a

properly endorsed certificate of title and certificate of
registration and proper application for registration,
accompanied by the required fee and when satisfied as to the
genuineness and regularity of such transfer and the right of
the transferee to a certificate of title, shall re-register the
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vehicle as upon a new registration in the name of the new owner
and issue a new certificate of registration and a certificate
of title as upon an original application."

Utah Code, Section

41-1-71 (1988).
A transfer of ownership is not complete " [u]ntil the
department shall have issued a new certificate of registration
and certificate of ownership, delivery of any vehicle required
to be registered shall be deemed not to have been made and
title thereto shall be deemed not to have passed, and said
intended transfer shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to
be valid or effective for any purpose . . . "

Utah Code,

Section 41-1-72 (1988) (Emphasis added).
Therefore, because full statutory compliance has not
been met, there was no transfer of title to Gerald Davis or
Rosalee Hansen.

Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 makes it clear

that the Motor Vehicle Act is relevant by stating who must
receive notice of a seizure.
"Notice of the seizure and intended
forfeiture shall be filed with the county
clerk, and served together with a copy of
the complaint, upon all persons known to
the county attorney to have a claim in
the property by one of the following
methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and
address is known, at the last known
address of the claimant, or upon each
owner whose right, title, or interest is
of record in the Division of Motor
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Vehicles, by mailing a copy of the notice
and complaint by certified mail to the
address given upon the records of the
division, which service is deemed complete
even though the mail is refused or cannot
be forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose
addresses are unknown, but who are
believed to have an interest in the
property, by one publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
county where the seizure was made.11
Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (9) (c) (1988).
Therefore, the only proper party to this action was
Joan Davis.
V.

NO SECURITY INTEREST EXISTS IN A VEHICLE
WITHOUT STATUTORY COMPLIANCE

To create a lien or security interest in a vehicle,
Article Five of Chapter 41 of the Utah Code must be complied
with.

" [N]o lien, upon a registered vehicle, except a lien

dependent upon possession, is valid as against the creditors of
an owner acquiring a lien by levy or attachment or subsequent
purchasers or encumbrances without notice until Sections
41-1-82 through 41-1-87 have been complied with."
Section 41-1-80(1) (1988).

Utah Code,

"If the vehicle is of a type

subject to registration but has not been registered, and no
certificate of title has been issued, . . . then the owner
shall file an application in the form of an original
registration and issuance of an original certificate of title.
Each application shall be accompanied by all applicable fees
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under this chapter."

Utah Code, Section 41-1-82 (1988).

Once application has been madef "the department shall
file it, and when satisfied as to the authenticity of the
application, shall issue a new certificate of title in usual
form, giving the name of the owner and a statement of all liens
or encumbrances certified to the department as existing against
the vehicle."

Utah Code, Section 41-1-83(1) (1988).

"The

filing and the issuance of a new certificate of title under
Sections 41-1-82 and 41-1-83 constitute constructive notice of
all liens and encumbrances against the vehicle to creditors of
the owner, or to subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers."
Utah Code, Section 41-1-85 (1988).
Joan Davis was registering a new van and she must have
complied with the lien provisions of the code.

(R.39 P.24).

Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen accompanied Joan Davis to the
bank at which time she had the certificate of title notarized
in her name when they were on notice that their names did not
appear as of record.

(R.39 P.24, 58, 59, 66).

As evidenced by the certificate of title, no liens or
encumbrances had been filed on the 1987 Dodge Caravan, Utah
license 720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096 at the time of seizure
and thus there are no legal liens or encumbrances.

(R.P.21).

If this court were to find that, as petitioners point
out, only a bona fide interest is required, Gerald Davis and
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Rosalee Hansen still have no interest in the van.
Petitioners point out that bona fide may be defined as
"honestly, openly and sincerely; without deceit or fraud."
Black's Law Dictionary P.92 (5th Ed. 1983).

(R.P.30).

If, as

petitioners allege, Gerald Davis and Rosalee Hansen have an
interest in the seized vehicle, there is nothing bona fide
about it.
The way they have chosen to memorialize their interest
is, in fact, hidden from all creditors and the State of Utah,
and the state is entitled to rely upon the certificate of title
as evidence of ownership.
The purported agreement written on May 9, 1987, was
kept by Rosalee Hansen in a safe in her home.

(R.39 P.45-46).

There was no way that anyone who wished to check for liens
would ever discover one if, in fact, there was one.

(R.39

P.45).
The legislature felt so strongly that all interest in
a vehicle be indicated on the certificate of title that they
made it a crime to fail to do so.

"It is a misdemeanor for any

person to fail or neglect to properly endorse and deliver a
valid certificate of title to a transferee or owner lawfully
entitled thereto within 48 hours . . . "

Utah Code, Section

41-1-76 (1988).
If we were to accept petitioners1 contention, anyone
could claim an interest in a vehicle, never have it recorded
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and the state or creditor's would never be able to rely on the
certificate of title as evidence of ownership.

The legislature

carefully guarded against this very situation by its discussion
of notice to encumbrancers of vehicles.

"The filing and

issuance of a new certificate of title . . . constitutes
constructive notice of all liens and encumbrances against the
vehicle to . . . subsequent . . . encumbrancers."
Section 41-1-85 (1988) .

Utah Code,

"The method provided . . . of giving

constructive notice of an encumbrance upon a registered vehicle
is exclusive."

Utah Code, Section 41-1-87 (1988).

Gerald Davis made an oral representation to Lt. Marty
Vuyk that there, in fact, was no written document evidencing a
security interest in the seized vehicle.

(R.37 P.58).

Joan

Davis also indicated to the seizing officers that the vehicle
was hers and it was paid for.

(R.37 P. 50-51).

Judge

Frederick found it significant that the purported agreement was
written in the past tense.

(R.38 P.5). Additionally, the

alleged receipts given to Gerry Davis by Rosalee Hansen were
illegible because she had failed to insert cardboard between
the sheets and they had all been written over.

(R.39 P.40).

There was no security agreement on file with the
Division of Motor Vehicles and the story presented by the
petitioners was not believed.
owned by Joan Davis only.

The vehicle was registered and

If Rosalee Hansen and Gerald Davis
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do have an interest in the van, they have failed to hold
themselves out openly and the state is therefore entitled to
forfeiture.
VI.

PETITIONERS1 TESTIMONY WAS NOT CREDIBLE

The state maintains a security interest did not exist
on the van.

Petitioners argue that there was a security

interest held by Rosalee Hansen.

Judge Frederick found that

the testimony of the petitioners was not credible in critical
areas.

(R.38 P.4).

"Where the evidence is in conflict we

defer to the trial court's first-hand assessment of the
witnesses' credibility and assume that the trial court believed
those aspects of the evidence which support its findings."

Hal

Taylor Associates v. Union America, 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah
1982).
Judge Frederick points out several areas where the
petitioners' story lacks credibility.

Joan Davis completed the

application for title and listed herself as the only owner
without a lienholder.

(R.38 P.4). Gerald Davis's testimony

conflicts as to the date he became aware of the title in Joan
Davis's name only.

(R.38 P.4).

Joan Davis told Detective

McCarthy she owned the vehicle and testified at trial it
belonged to her husband.

(R.38 P.4). Gerald Davis phoned Lt.

Vuyk the day after seizure indicating no written agreement
existed indicating a security interest, yet testified he signed
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one on May 9, 1987.

(R.38 P.4, R.37 P.57).

Gerald Davis testified at trial he put $2,900.00 down
on the van.

(R.37 P.61).

In an affidavit filed with the

court, he states he put $5,000.00 down on the van.

(R.P.34).

Gerald Davis testified that he paid $1,600.00 in cash yet he
maintained a checking account at the time from which he paid
the balance to Hinckley Dodge (R.37 P.70, 63).
Rosalee Hansen testified she received a $9,700.00
cashier's check from a gentleman she didn't know.
P.51).

She could not produce a receipt for it.

(R.37
(R.37 P.51).

Rosalee Hansen kept the money in her home after going to the
bank with the unknown person to cash the check.

(R.37 P.52).

Rosalee Hansen maintained several bank accounts during the time
period.

(R.37 P.52-53).

The alleged security agreement was

drafted on May 9, 1987, yet is written in the past tense.
(R.38 P.5). The alleged receipts are illegible.

(R.37 P.40).

It is clear that the finder of fact found the
testimony of the petitioners not to be credible and ruled based
upon that.

(R.38 P.4).

This court should accept his findings

of fact which support the judgment entered based upon his
assessment of the witnesses credibility.
11.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah
respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of
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the trial court allowing the forfeiture of the Dodge Van, Utah
license 720BHT, VIN 2B4FK51G5HR179096.
DATED this

l&

day of April, 1989.
DAVID E. YOCOM
Salt Lake County Attorney

RENA BARBIERO
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM
A.

Utah Code, Section 58-37-13 (1988) et seq.

79

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

with federal and other state agencies in discharging
their responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled
substances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled
substances. To this end, they are authorized to:
(a) Arrange for the exchange of information
between governmental officials concerning the
use and abuse of dangerous substances.
(b) Co-ordinate and co-operate in training programs in controlled substance law enforcement
at the local and state levels.
(c) Co-operate with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bureau of Investigation by establishing a centralized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and collect statistics, including records of drug-dependent persons and other controlled substance law
offenders within the state, and make the information available for federal, state, and local law
enforcement purposes.
(d) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant species from which controlled substances may be extracted.
1971
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Procedure.
(1) The following are suoject to forfeiture, and no
property right exists in them:
(a) all controlled substances which have been
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act:
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment
of any kind used, or intended for use. in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or exporting any controlled substance in
violation of this act;
(c) all property used or intended for use as a
container for property described in Subsections
(l)(a) and (1Kb);
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with
health food supplements and herbs, used or intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this act;
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described in Subsections (IMaj
or (1Mb), except that:
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a
common carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited under this section unless it appears
that the owner or other person in charge of
the conveyance was a consenting party or
privy to violation of this act:
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any act or omission committed or omitted without the
owner's knowledge or consent; and
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject
to a bona fide security interest is subject to
the interest of a secured party who could not
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take
place in the use of the conveyance;
(f) all books, records, and research, including
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this act;
(g) everything of value furnished or intended
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled sub-

58-37-13

stance in violation of this act, all proceeds traceable to any violation of this act, and all moneys,
negotiable instruments, and securities used or
intended to be used to facilitate any violation of
this act; but:
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act;
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that
all money, coins, and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances,
drug manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of
controlled substances are forfeitable under
this section; the burden of proof is upon
claimants of the property to rebut this presumption;
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
and
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real property of any kind
used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, warehousing, stonng, protecting, or manufacturing any controiled substances in violation
of this chapter, except that:
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or interest in real
property is subject to the bona fide security
interest of a party who could not have known
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a
violation would take place on the property;
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsection if the holder of
the interest did not know of the act which
made the property subject to forfeiture, or
did not willingly consent to the act:
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing,
or storage facility or interest in real property
may not be forfeited under this section unless cumulative sales of controiled substances on the property within a two-month
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street
value of any controlled substances found on
the premises at any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced
in controlled substances law enforcement
may testify to establish the street value of
the controlled substances for purposes of this
subsection.
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act
may be seized by any peace officer of this state upon
process issued by any court having jurisdiction over
the property. However, seizure without process may
be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or
search under a search warrant or an inspection
under an administrative inspection warrant;
lb) the property subject to seizure has been the
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding under this act;
<c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is directly or indirectly
dangerous to health or safety; or
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(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has been used or intended
to be used in violation of this act.
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2),
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted
promptly
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the
orders and decrees of the court or the official having
jurisdiction When property is seized under this act
the appropriate person or agency may*
(a) place the property under seal;
(b) remove the property to a place designated
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or
(c) take custody of the property and remove it
to an appropriate location for disposition in accordance with law
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which
are seized or come into the possession of the state are
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the
state if the owners are unknown.
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances m Schedules I and II are denved which have
been planted or cultivated in violation of this act, or
of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state.
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in
control of land or premises upon which species of
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof that he is the holder of a
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of
the plants.
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act
by a finding of the court that no person is entitled to
recover the property, it shall be deposited in the custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all
property is as follows:
(a) The state may include in its complaint
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing
agency be awarded the property Upon a finding
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited
property in the enforcement of controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the case shall award the property to the
seizing agency The seizing agency shall pay to
the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred m
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed
against any defendant in the case.
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal
costs for filing and pursuing the forfeiture and
upon application for the property to the director
of the Division of Finance The application shall
clearly set forth the need for the property and the
use to which the property will be put.
(c) The director of the Division of Finance
shall review all applications for property submitted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing
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agency makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and advisability as to
final disposition and shall notify the designated
applicant or seizing agency, where no application
is made, who may obtain the property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department.
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing agency or agencies.
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be
upon oath of two officers or employees of the department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of the department or his designated agent.
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be
made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation
shall be prepared by the county attorney where
the property was seized or is to be seized and filed
in the district court. The complaint shall describe
with reasonable particularity:
d) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(u) the date and place of seizure, if known;
and
(m) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the
district court shall forthwith issue a warrant for
seizure of the property which is the subject matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for
service, unless the property has previously been
seized without a warrant, under Subsection
58-37-13(2).
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the county clerk, and
served together with a copy of the complaint,
upon all persons known to the county attorney to
have a claim in the property by one of the following methods:
d) upon each claimant whose name and
address is known, at the last known address
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose
right, title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy
of the notice and complaint by certified mail
to the address given upon the records of the
division, which service is deemed complete
even though the mail is refused or cannot be
forwarded, and
(n) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but who are believed
to have an interest in the property, by one
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure was
made
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party shall file with the court a
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days
after service has been obtained.
(e) When property is seized under this act, any
interested person or claimant of the property,
pnor to being served with a complaint under this
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section, may file a petition in the district court
for release of his interest in the property The
petition shall specify the claimant's interest in
the property and his right to have it released. A
copy shall be served upon the county attorney in
the county of the seizure, who shall answer the
petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not
answer a complaint of forfeiture.
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner
an opportunity to present evidence in support of
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the
property as the court determines. If the county
attorney has not filed an answer to a petition for
release and the court determines from- the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that
period, the court shall order the release of the
property to the petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court
shall bet the matter for hearing within 20 davs.
At this hearing all interested parties may
present evidence of their rights of release of the
property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case and
order forfeiture or release of the property as it
determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent
of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state.
(U When the court determines that claimants
have no n g h t in the property in whole or in part,
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The division shall dispose of the
property under Subsection (8)
(j) When the court determines that property,
in whole or m part, is not subject to forfeiture, it
shall order release of the property to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it
shall order partial release and partial forfeiture.
When the property cannot be divided for partial
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it
sold and the proceeds distributed:
d) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants,
(n) second, to defray the costs of the action, inciuding seizure, storage of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and
(in) third, to the Division of Finance for
the General Fund,
(k) In a proceeding under this section where
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceeding, including seizure and storage of the
property, against the individual or individuals
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and
may assess costs against any other claimant or
claimants to the property as appropriate
1987
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R e s o r t for illegal u s e o r p o s s e s s i o n of

controlled substances deemed common nuisance — District court power
to suppress and enjoin.

58-37-17

>1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house,
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to
which users or possessors of any controlled substances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or
where use or possession of any substances violates
this act. or which is used for illegal keeping, storing,
or selling any substances listed as controlled substances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or
maintain any such place
(2) The district court has the power to make any
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nuisance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continuation of a nuisance.
1971
58-37-15.

Burden of proof in p r o c e e d i n g s on vi-

olations — Enforcement officers exempt from liability.
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act,
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception
is upon the person claiming its benefit.
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registration, order form, or prescription issued under this act,
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license,
registration, order form, or prescription, and the burden of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption.
13) No liability shall be imposed upon any duly authorized state or federal officer engaged in the enforcement of this act who is engaged in the enforcement of any law, municipal ordinance, or regulation
relating to controlled substances.
1971

58-37-16. Powers to order testimony of witnesses or production of evidence —
Immunity of witness compelled to testify.
If the prosecuting attorney or attorney general of
the state of Utah determines that the testimony of
any witness or the production of any book, paper, or
other evidence by any witness before a grand jury or
court of the state of Utah involving any violation of
this chapter is necessary, he bhall make application
to the court that the witness be instructed to testify
or produce evidence subject to the provisions of this
section and upon order of the court the witness shall
not be excused from testifying or producing books,
papers, or other evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate him or
subject him to forfeiture No witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penaltv or forfeiture on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning
which he is compelled to testify after having claimed
his privilege against seif-incrimination or produce evidence nor shall any such evidence be used in any
criminal proceeding against him in anv court except
prosecutions described in this section No witness is
exempt under this section from prosecution tor perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony
oi- producing evidence under compulsion.
1971
58-37-17. Judicial review.
(1) Any person aggrieved by a department's final
order may obtain judicial review
(2) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings is in the district court of Salt Lake
County
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